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Finally, Henry Kissinger's voluminous memoirs are a special case. Written by the pivotal character of the post-war diplomacy, in staggering detail, based on recollection and archival material, they are among the most frequently cited sources in the works discussed above. Kissinger clearly hoped to shape his own historiography and portrayed his efforts in a positive light. The memoirs paint a picture wherein the Syria-Israel disengagement agreement, negotiated by Kissinger, was as good an outcome as either side could have achieved.
Thereafter, further progress was nigh on impossible, for reasons that were not of Kissinger's making. As with most of the authors discussed above, Kissinger too frames the Syria negotiations as merely a part of the greater tale of Israel and Egypt. While his narrative does 6 sugarcoat his own actions (and inactions), it is on the whole not markedly dishonest, as measured against the findings of the present study. 8 With the exception of Gani's, all significant accounts of these events have to a large extent been based on the personal narratives of people involved in the diplomacy -Kissinger through his memoirs, Assad through his interviews with Patrick Seale, plus interviews with and memoirs by several secondary characters. The present account is based on in-depth research in the holdings of the Nixon and Ford presidential libraries, where large bodies of archival material has recently been declassified, supplemented by several digital collections and newly declassified Israeli documents. It is the first chapter in the history of American relations with the Assad dynasty in Syria, kept alive through chronic troubles ever since. well as the restitution of Palestinian rights. 11 Washington took note of this move by the formerly staunchly rejectionist Syrians, though it led to no change in US policy. Since accepting UNSCR 242 implicitly meant that Syria, for the first time, recognized Israel's right to exist, this move could be interpreted as a Syrian olive branch. However, given that Assad and Sadat were planning a war, two different interpretations seem plausible: that recognizing 242 was part of a ruse, to sow confusion about Syria's true intentions; and that Syria thus positioned itself to partake in whatever diplomatic process might follow the war, within the same framework as Egypt. In the morning of 6 October, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked
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Israel, catching the Israelis off-guard. Assad hoped the day had finally come to overturn years of Arab humiliation and reclaim the Golan Heights. Though the war began with early Syrian and Egyptian triumphs, the Israelis struck back, reclaimed lost territory and then some, including a salient protruding ominously toward Damascus. After intense consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and two ignored or broken ceasefire resolutions from the UN Security Council (338 and 339), a third one (340) took hold on 25
October. 12 While Egypt and Syria lost the war militarily, it was nothing like their collapses in 1967, nor was it a defeat in political terms. The October War restored morale throughout the When American diplomats spoke to their Syrian counterparts, they took great care to note how resolving Syria's grievances with Israel were integral to their diplomatic efforts.
Step by step, they promised, a just and final settlement was approaching. another limited Golan agreement. 97 Israel would only consider evacuation in the context of a full-fledged peace settlement and described any possible territorial offerings in another stepby-step agreement as 'cosmetic.' 98 Meeting Rabin again some days later, Kissinger described his favorite concept for how to include Syria in the process: '[T]he best way would be to start disengagement talks through us without me at that stage. We would both understand that they would not be likely to succeed. Then at a time when a stalemate appears near, you would make some cosmetic changes unilaterally as a gesture of good will. The geopolitically weak Syria would therefore have to manoeuver with extraordinary skill to achieve its goals in this complex duel with Israel, Egypt, the US and others, whose goals were different. In the end, Assad had been dealt a weak hand, and, despite all his considerable skill, could not wrest a favorable outcome from it. Through these contacts, Kissinger came to value the Assad regime as a known, stable and trustworthy entity, and appears to have preferred getting Syria a better deal with Israel than he did. But for Kissinger, the geopolitical
